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Lecture 18 – Internatonal Economics
The Internatonal Financial System and 
the Global Financial Crises
Preview
• Introducton to the current system of internatonal governance
• The Internatonal Monetary Fund and its policies
• Internatonal fnancial markets
• Financial globalizaton and fnancial crises
• Lessons to be learnt from crise
The Internatonal Economic Governance
 The present global governance of internatonal economics stem from the 
Breton Woods treaty (1944)
 The architecture is due to J.M. Keynes and is based on three major 
insttutons: the IMF (to atain fnancial stability), the IBRD (to coordinate 
development strategies) and the WTO (to manage internatonal trade).
 Only the IMF and IBRD were born in Breton Woods, while the WTO was 
only founded in 1994, with the Marrakech Treaty.
 Originally, the IMF set up a system of fied eichange rates:
 All currencies had fied eichange rates against the USD and an 
unvarying dollar price of gold ($35 an ounce).
 It intended to provide lending to countries with current account 
defcits, for stabilizaton purposes
 It called for currency convertbility.
The IMF: Goals and Policies
 The IMF Agreement tried to incorporate sufcient feiibility to allow 
countries to atain eiternal balance without sacrifcing internal objectves 
or fied eichange rates.
 Two major features of the IMF Artcles of Agreement helped promote this 
feiibility in eiternal adjustment:
 IMF lending facilites are based on IMF conditonality: the surveillance 
over the policies of member countes that borrow Fund resources.
 Adjustable parites
 The IMF functoning adapted to the post-1973 system of feiible eichange 
rates, although subject to strong critcism by countries, social movements 
and critcal economists
Policies Optons in a Flexible Exchange 
Rate Regime
Internal Balance (II), Eiternal Balance (XX), and the “Four Zones of Economic 
Discomfort”
The IMF: Goals and Policies (2)
Goals
 To promote internatonal cooperaton through the coordinaton of eichange 
rate policies
 To enhance internatonal trade
 To build a multlateral system of payments
 To help atain trade balance and eliminate public budget defcits
Functons
 To monitor the internatonal fnancial system and the policies of individual 
countries
 To provide fnancial assistance
 To provide technical assistance
Policy structure
 The IMF is basically a bank, and control depends on the majority of shares
 G8 + EU: 56% of the shares. US alone has 18% of the shares (strong veto power 
according to IMF rules)
The IMF: Goals and Policies (3)
Goals
  The IMF is lending conditonal to the implementaton of economic reforms 
(the recipe needed, according to the IMF, to solve macro imbalances)
 The lending is requested when there are imbalances in the BoP, when 
there is a debt crisis, when there are pressures on the eichange rate
 It is not fnancing development;
 More or less, lending is subject to the current market conditons.
The conditonalitis
 Spending review to stabilize debt and to provide macroeconomic 
conditons to growth
 Restrictve monetary policies to stop infaton and stabilize the currency
 Structural reforms to modernize the country
 Liberalize the markets to trigger efciency in the allocaton of resources
 Privatze, to trigger efciency, diminish corrupton and the public debt.
Internatonal Capital Markets
• Internatonal capital markets are markets trading diferent types of 
fnancial and physical assets (capital): stocks, bonds (government and 
private sector), deposits denominated in diferent currencies, 
commodites (like petroleum, wheat, bauiite, gold), forward contracts, 
futures contracts, swaps, optons contracts, real estate and land, factories 
and equipment, derivatves.
• Buyers and sellers can trade:
– goods or services for other goods or services (the theory of 
comparatve advantage describes the gains from trade of goods and 
services for other goods and services)
– goods or services for assets (the theory of intertemporal trade 
describes the gains from this type of trade between today’s assets and 
tomorrow level of consumpto.
– assets for assets (theory or just speculaton?)
Portolio Diversifcaton 
• The theory of portolio diversifcaton describes the gains from trade of 
assets with one type of risk for assets with another type of risk.
– Investng in a diverse set, or portolio, of assets is a way for investors to 
avoid or reduce risk. 
– People usually display risk aversion.
– If value is created through the eichange of assets, mutual advantages 
appear.
– However, value quickly disappear, partcularly when derivatve products 
are traded and in high-frequency trading.
– There is a thin line between value creaton and speculaton, in a 
changing world where regulaton and control over banks is less and less 
efectve
Financial Speculaton 
• Generally, investment can take two forms:
– Real Investment: the goal is proft and its distributon to shareholders
– Financial Investment: the goal is the capital gain (increase in the value 
of the asset).
– While the capital gain is value creaton for the fnancial frm, it is 
commonly defned speculaton.
– Non fnancial frms are increasing their interest in fnancial investment, 
implying a radical change in the management strategy: the investment 
horizon shifs from the long term (proft) to the short term (capital 
gain).
• Consequences:
– Instability and economic unsustainability if the growth rate of fnancial 
markets is larger than real economic growth rate
– Strong volatlity, fnancial bubbles and panic crises.
Trader 1 - I've got a stock here 
that could really eicel...
Others - Really Eicel? Eicel? Sell? 
Sell! Sell!
Trader 2 - This is madness! I can't 
take it anymore. Good Bye!
Others - Good Bye? Bye? Buy? 
Buy! Buy!!
Trader 3 - I've got a stock here...
Kal, The Economist, 1 Novembre 
1997.
Financial Crisis as a “Perfect Storm” 
• Financial crises periodically happen when a certain mix of macroeconomic 
imbalances, economic policies and fnancial disequilibrium appear.
• They become more frequent and deeper since internatonal fnancial 
integraton between markets (quicker internatonal contagion).
• A general framework to eiplain crises:
1. Evoluton of fnancial markets:
1.1 Financial innovaton
1.2 Insufcient or unefectve (de)regulaton and lack of a coordinated 
vigilance authority
2. Macroeconomic eiternal and internal imbalances
3. Inefectve or contradictory macroeconomic policies and reforms.
Financial Innovaton
• Research in Finance and the development of ICT allowed:
– Strong development of derivatve products: fnancial assets which value 
depends on the trend of a fundamental asset. 
– Securitzaton: creaton of assets through selecton and aggregaton of 
other assets.
– Eiponental growth of over-the-counter transactons in real-tme.
– Development of ofshore banking and other ways to avoid taies and 
regulaton.
• Consequences:
– From investment to speculaton to betng.
– Regulators are always one step behind than fnancial markets.
– Dangerous interconnecton between fnance and criminality.
Deregulaton of Financial Markets
● Free capital movement is one of the main characteristcs of the globalizaton 
process:
● Since the 1970s: aboliton of fied commissions on transactons.
● Since the 1980s: Reducton and eliminaton of limits and controls on 
capital transfers
● 1999: Aboliton of the Glass-Steagall Act, which was separatng 
commercial and investment banks.
● Consequences:
● Increasing market concentraton (JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, 
Citygroup, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, UBS, Lehman Brothers)
● Increasing returns mainly stemming from increasing risk.
● Race to the botom and moral hazard behaviour (too big too fail)
● Quick internatonal contagion and difcult interventons (too big to save)
• Policies have been partally reversed afer the crisis:
• Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. (2010)
– It allows the government to regulate “systemically important” nonbank 
fnancial insttutons and to take them over in case of failure.
– It prohibits commercial banks from making certain types of speculatve 
investments (Volcker rule).  
• EU: new fnancial supervision architecture (2011)
– European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) for macro-prudental oversight of 
the fnancial system
– European Banking Authority, European Insurance and Occupatonal 
Pensions Authority, and European Securites and Markets Authority.
– Bank surveillance is unifed under the ECB, rather than natonal Cbs.
• Measures are subject to strong politcal pressure and might be changed
Deregulaton of Financial Markets (2)
Macroeconomic Internal and External 
Imbalances
● Policies are efectve in the short run, but they create / worsen 
macroeconomic imbalances if they become permanent:
● Government budget / Sovereign debt crisis
● Current Account / Reserve crisis
● Infatonary pressure / Eichange rate crisis
● These imbalances ofen develop together, worsening the situaton
● Consequences:
● Foreign capitals are frst atracted, because of higher returns stemming 
from increasing risk
● However they know that stabilizaton policies will have to be 
implemented, or changes in the economic fundamentals will appear
● Hit-and-run sort of behaviour, which is connected with bank run and 
fnancial panic. 
● The fnancial crisis will eventually happen, although it is almost 
impossible to predict when.
Macroeconomic Internal and External 
Imbalances (2)
● Many recent eiample:
● The cumulate defcit in the US current account between 1999 and 2007 
is 4600 USD mld (¼ of the GDP); In those years, the eiternal debt of the 
US was multplied by 4, becoming 13400 USD mld.
● Symmetrically, the Chinese Trade Surplus is 10% of the GDP and China 
has foreign assets equal to 2800 USD mld.
● Latn American imbalances in the 1908s: infaton, public and eiternal 
debt.
● East-Asian crisis of 1997, mainly due to moral hazard and insufcient 
bank regulaton and monitoring
● Russia crisis of 1998: too much government spending, weak insttutons 
and regulatons.  
Cumulatve Current Account Balances, 
1973–2009 (billions of dollars) 
Inefectve and Contradictory
Macroeconomic Policies
● Most of the crises have been fuelled by contradictory or short-sighted 
economic policies:
● Greenspan doctrine of “great moderaton”: contnuous increase in 
money supply to fnance the US twin defcit and to back fnancial markets 
(but help creatng fnancial bubbles)
● Inability to keep fscal policy under control (for many Latn American 
countries) which led to infatonary policies, aggravated by the impact of 
eiternal shocks and by the “original sin”.
● When low and middle-income countries borrow in internatonal 
fnancial markets, their debts are denominated in USD, yen, or Euro:
● When a depreciaton/devaluaton of domestc currency occurs, the 
value of their liabilites (debt) rises, implying a decrease in net foreign 
wealth.
● Contradicton / unsustainability of fixed exchange rate policies (such as 
currency boards or dollarizaton.
Currency Boards and Dollarizaton
• A currency board is a system where the money supply is entrely backed 
by foreign currency, and where the central bank is prevented from 
holding domestc assets.
– The central bank may not increase the domestc money supply by 
buying government bonds, stopping infaton and government defcit.
– A currency board is more restrictve than a regular fied eichange rate 
system, since it does not allow the Central Bank to act as lender of last 
resort to domestc banks during a fnancial crisis.
● Dollarizaton is a monetary policy that replaces the domestc currency in 
circulaton with U.S. dollars: control of domestc money supply, interest 
rates, and infaton is given to the Federal Reserve System.
● These policies are efectve iif the macroeconomic fundamentals of the two 
countries are aligned. Otherwise a devaluaton is eipected, triggering a 
fnancial crisis (e.g. Argentna).
Lessons of Crises
• Countries face tradeofs when trying to achieve the following goals: 1. 
eichange rate stability; 2. fnancial mobility; 3. autonomous monetary policy 
devoted to internal balance.
• The open economy trilemma: generally, countries can atain only 2 of the 3 
goals.
• As fnancial assets have become more mobile, maintaining a fied eichange 
with an autonomous monetary policy has been difcult.
• Fiiing the eichange rate has risks: high interest rates and too restrictve 
economic policies (high unemployment).
• An autonomous monetary policy (to support government defcit or 
aggregate demand) results in infaton and pressure for devaluaton.
• A fied currency may encourage banks and frms to borrow in foreign 
currencies, but a devaluaton will cause an increase in the burden of this 
debt and may lead to a banking crisis and bankruptcy.
Lessons of Crises (2) 
● Weak enforcement of fnancial regulaton can lead to risky investments 
and a banking crisis when a currency crisis erupts or when a fall in 
output, income, and employment occurs.
● Liberalizing fnancial fows without implementng a sound fnancial 
regulaton can lead to capital fight.
● The importance of eipectatons: even healthy economies are vulnerable to 
crises when expectatons change. Eipectatons about an economy 
ofen change when other economies sufer from adverse events.  
● Internatonal crises may result from contagion: an adverse event in one 
country leads to a similar event in other countries.
● The importance of having adequate ofcial internatonal reserves: Ofcial 
internatonal reserves are needed not just for a current account 
defcit, but more importantly to protect against capital fight due to 
speculaton and eipectatons about fnancial crises.
